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Abstract: Philip Jackson’s “The Mimetic and the Transformative: Alternative 
Outlooks on Teaching” is widely read both inside and outside of philosophy 
of education circles and courses, and is best known for sketching out the 
long-standing difference between the mimetic and transformative traditions 
in teaching. In this paper I argue that we need to move beyond the 
mimetic/transformative divide and to a new tradition of teaching. I make the 
case that Jackson’s understanding of assessment and adaptive education are 
unduly limiting, and this is what keeps his thinking bound to a dualism that 
needs to be reconstructed. Once reconstructed, new possibilities for 
philosophers of education, teacher educators and teachers are disclosed.  
 
In this paper I revisit what I take to be one of the most influential papers written by 
a philosopher of education in recent memory, Philip Jackson’s “The Mimetic and the 
Transformative: Alternative Outlooks on Teaching.”1 Jackson’s paper is widely read 
both inside and outside of philosophy of education circles and courses, and is best 
known for sketching out the long-standing difference between the mimetic and 
transformative traditions in teaching.2 Although Jackson recognizes that almost 
every form of teaching has aspects of mimesis and transformation, when we think 
about practices of teaching, one tradition is generally more dominant than the other. 
Mimetic teaching aims to reproduce or replicate some existing standard and 
transformative teaching is responsive to the unknown and the unforeseeable in the 
triangular relationship between student, teacher and subject.3 Instead of leading 
students to some preordained and foreseen end, transformative teaching aims to 
free students for possibilities of growth and development that are impossible to 
determine in advance.   
Presciently, Jackson saw that the growing standards and accountability 
movement—backed by new technologies and a fervent positivistic belief in the 
power of assessment—would lead to a resurgence in the belief that mimetic 
teaching should be chosen over transformative teaching. Instead of aiming for 
amorphous and difficult to quantify goals like moral development or creative 
experimentation on the part of students, emerging technologies of assessment—
with a promise that students could be led to learn anything that could be 
reproduced—allowed mimetic teaching to dominant the imagination—often driven 
by fear—of what teaching should be. With a nation’s educational system at risk, why 
work on transformation that is difficult to facilitate and even more difficult to 
deliver on, when mimetic teaching would allow students to learn what they need to 
know in order to be productive earners and citizens? This is Jackson’s deep concern. 
A concern that very few people would choose the transformative over the mimetic, 
and so we might land in the position we are in now, thirty years after Jackson’s 
prophetic essay. Who can doubt that the mimetic tradition of teaching has not 
become dominant in educational practices? Instead of attempting the difficult work 
of letting students sit with ambiguity, teachers feel forced to teach to tests. Instead 
of allowing students the time it takes to develop into who they are meant to—or 
aspire to— become, students are captured by how well they can game a test and 
reproduce what is expected. Examples go on in countless directions. And though 
many teachers continue to hold onto transformative ideals and find ways to enact 
them in practice, they often do so through strenuous efforts of will and imagination, 
and often at great risk to their livelihood.4 As Doris Santoro convincingly 
demonstrates, good teachers are leaving the profession—she evocatively labels 
them conscientious objectors—because transformative teaching has almost no 
officially—or politically—valued place in our time.5 
I return to Jackson’s essay not only because of its prescience, but because he 
begins his essay hoping that the mimetic and transformative traditions might be 
brought closer together. Instead of choosing between one form of teaching over the 
other, Jackson hoped that he could—at least conceptually—find a way to bring the 
best of both traditions together.6 As Dewey argues in Experience and Education, we 
shouldn’t be forced into deciding between the “old” versus the “new” in education, 
we should seek what is worthy of the name education. I see Jackson attempting 
something similar in his essay: instead of choosing between the mimetic and the 
transformative, he wants us to seek out what is worthy of the name teaching. And, 
what is worthy of the name teaching can only come about if we move beyond the 
mimetic/transformative dualism and to our next better attempt at finding—or 
founding—a tradition of teaching. 
Although Jackson begins “The Mimetic and the Transformative” on a hopeful 
note, the essay ends pessimistically, and understandably so. Jackson is able to 
imagine and recall individual teachers who find ways to enact what is good in both 
traditions, the traditions—as traditions—seem fixed in place with the mimetic in the 
dominant—if not almost exclusive—position. In Jackson’s age as in ours, the 
opportunities for transformative teaching are few and undervalued. As such, I read 
his essay as something of a call—one especially directed to philosophers of 
education—to keep the transformative tradition of teaching alive, because it seems 
nearly impossible—given the hold mimetic teaching has on an imagination driven 
by fear of America’s “failing” schools—to get a hearing for the tradition of 
transformative teaching. Without this type of hearing, it will be impossible to 
develop a tradition of teaching that brings together what is good in both the 
transformative and mimetic traditions. Though he doesn’t make it fully apparent 
that the transformative needs to be defended in “The Mimetic and the 
Transformative”—he does this in “Facing Our Ignorance”7—as readers work 
through Jackson’s essay I find it hard to believe that many would want to be on the 
side of the Sophists against Socrates, or on the side of the fillers of vessels versus the 
artists and creators. Maybe unintentionally—or maybe because of the very real 
pressures poised to choke out the transformative tradition of teaching—Jackson 
seems to foreclose the possibility of forging a new tradition of teaching that 
combines what is good in both traditions, because he finds it almost impossible to 
find a way to enact the transformative in the mimetic era we continue to live in. 
It is especially at this point that I find it important to return to Jackson 
because if he offers little hope of bringing the mimetic and transformative traditions 
of teaching, doesn’t this consign those of us who stand for the transformative 
tradition to be forever outside of conversations that dominate our educational era? 
That is, if the transformative tradition doesn’t have a voice in the mimetic era we are 
living in, where does this leave philosophers of education? If many philosophers of 
education are on the side of transformative traditions in teaching, and therefore 
outside of dominant educational discourses, is it a surprise that philosophers of 
education often wonder about relevance, audience and purpose?8 In print and in 
informal conversations, philosophers of education struggle with the role that we can 
play in the types of conversation that dominate our educational era. Though it may 
be—to echo Emerson—great to be misunderstood,9 what if there is more to mimetic 
teaching than Jackson sees? In particular, what if Jackson’s concern that new 
technologies of assessment that give the mimetic tradition of power its newfound 
power might be something that can be used to transformative ends? That is, might 
there be ways for reconstructed mimetic assessments to facilitate the aims of 
transformative teaching? Answering this question is the main goal of this paper. 
To be clear, I certainly don’t believe that transformative teaching should be 
subsumed to mimetic ones. The mimetic era, guided by narrow visions of 
assessment and accountability—as countless scholars inside and outside philosophy 
of education have demonstrated10—is mis-educative, and we have to do everything 
possible to reassert the aims of transformative teaching. But, I worry that Jackson 
doesn’t do enough to work through dissolving surface differences between the  
mimetic and transformative traditions in teaching, and this is tied to his too narrow 
view of assessment and its role in teaching.11 Again, Jackson was importantly 
prescient in his worry that assessment would play the role it now plays in 
education: largely punitive; largely superficial (choosing to measure what is easy to 
measure rather than what actually matters); largely in service of mimetic teaching. 
But, as a philosopher of education, I would have loved to see Jackson’s keen and 
critical intelligence think more about how assessment might foster transformative 
teaching. If Jackson could have found more ways to show how the transformative is 
held nascent within ostensibly mimetic teaching, then more could have been done to 
assert the transformative, but from inside of dominant conversations. This is the 
main goal of my paper. My aim is to suggest that we can come closer to the tradition 
of teaching Jackson hoped to discover in his essay through a rethinking of the 
possibilities of assessment, and—as a possible consequence of doing this—offer 
philosophers of education interesting opportunities to reengage with the broader 
educational community.12 
 
Jackson’s Understanding of Assessment and Its Limitations 
 
In “The Mimetic and the Transformative” assessment is often only addressed 
indirectly, but I see it looming in the background at many turns. Jackson criticizes 
the growing teacher accountability movement, criticizes the fact that we often only 
measure what can be easiest measured and so teach what can be most efficiently 
transmitted to students, and he relatedly worries a great deal about the “gradual 
emergence and the ultimate hegemony of a “scientific spirit” within the educational 
community.”13 To get a fuller picture of Jackson’s thinking on assessment, one needs 
to follow a footnote. The footnote comes at the end of this passage: 
 
Those who look upon the growth of the mimetic tradition as an 
unadulterated good or close to that….view the decline of the transformative 
tradition with equal delight. They believe it rids the teaching profession of 
unnecessary sentimentality and mystifying talk about vague notions like 
character and virtue and at the same time removes yet another roadblock 
toward making the practice of teaching more objective and precise and its 
results more measurable.14 
 
This is a key point. Jackson almost always links assessment to something like a 
positivist worldview and he also sees assessment as antithetical to an appreciative 
understanding of character and virtue in education. While there are some in 
education who may see talk of character as pointless and misleading and who do 
believe that the goal of assessment is to achieve the certainty of positivist 
objectivity, I don’t think this is anything like the whole story. Someone committed to 
using assessment as a means to improving education15 is not necessarily committed 
to a belief that assessment is objective, and she is certainly not committed to a world 
where character and virtue are banished from schooling and education.16 Jackson’s 
way of telling the story establishes a faulty dualism that only reinforces a 
mimetic/transformative divide. Here is where the footnote linked to the passage is 
important. Jackson references a published exchange with Robert Glaser17 and it is in 
this exchange where we most clearly see the limitations of Jackson’s thinking on 
assessment and how it only serves to solidify the mimetic/transformative divide. 
 In “Private Lessons in Public Schools: Remarks on the Limits of Adaptive 
Instruction,” Jackson both introduces the terms mimetic and transformative, and 
focuses on the role that assessment plays in privileging the mimetic at the expense 
of exploring and cultivating education’s transformative possibilities. It is important 
to note the “adaptive” (or what is also referred to as “cybernetic”) teaching is the 
most current iteration of the mimetic tradition. While adaptive should not be taken 
to encompass all instances of mimetic teaching, in many ways, adaptive education—
facilitated by new technologies and new assessment technologies—is, to Jackson, 
mimetic education in its most seductive and pernicious form. Jackson has two key 
criticisms of how adaptive education makes assessment central to learning. First, 
Jackson is highly skeptical of adaptive models of teaching because adaptive 
instruction, given Jackson’s understanding of it, is premised on a belief that 
education has to be broken down into manageable steps in order for learning to 
happen.18 Second, Jackson believes adaptive education, driven as it is by assessment, 
is necessarily mimetic because there are too many educational objectives and 
aspirations that simply cannot be assessed. According to Jackson, when we focus on 
assessment we are always—even if unintentionally—devaluing transformative 
goals and aspirations.  
  Here is how Jackson describes adaptive education: “Reduced to its simplest 
terms, [adaptive education] calls for comparing the student’s performance with 
some standard of what is desired—evaluating the “match” between that 
performance and the educational environment, as Glaser puts it—and then deciding 
what to do on the basis of that comparison.”19 Jackson uses the example of the 
relationship between a piano teacher and her pupil to stand as exemplary of 
adaptive education. The piano teacher knows how the piece should be performed, 
and she judges the student’s performance against that standard. If the student meets 
the standard, teacher and pupil can move forward. But, if the student falters, the 
teacher localizes errors and missteps, and adapts her instruction to make sure that 
the student overcomes those errors and so meets the standard. This will generally 
mean practicing a specified section of the piece in order to successfully perform the 
entire piece proficiently. 
Jackson makes the piano teaching example analogous to adaptive instruction in 
general. Jackson writes: 
 
the fundamental principles [of adaptive education] are: 
 
 divide a complex learning task into its component parts, 
 get the student to work on each part sequentially, 
 monitor his performance, matching it against some standard of what is 
desired, and 
 make such corrections as are necessary to bring the performance in line 
with the model (the latter set of actions being accomplished by a variety 
of means, sometimes involving the teacher and something not.) 
 
The most rudimentary form of these adaptive principles I shall call “mimetic,” 
meaning imitative. I do so because, when stripped of all their embellishments—
as in the piano teaching example—their fundamental aim is to get the student to 
reproduce or imitate in his own actions or words a form of behavior that has 
already been settled upon.20 
 
As a description of adaptive instruction, this is relatively fair. A teacher who adapts 
her instruction has a clear instructional goal in mind—to follow Jackson’s example, 
the student will play a piece of music proficiently—and then creates tasks and 
opportunities that allow the student to progress toward meeting this goal—the 
student begins with the opening, or with the easier parts of the piece, and then 
moves on to other parts of the piece or begins to work on the more difficult parts of 
the piece—and then the instructor assesses whether the student plays the piece 
well or needs to go back to one of the steps in order to play the piece well as 
measured against a clear standard of excellence. If the student is successful, she will 
reproduce or imitate what the teacher has in mind when she started her instruction. 
I note that Jackson’s description of adaptive instruction is only relatively fair 
because a teacher can adapt instruction without decomposing a goal into steps that 
must be worked on sequentially, and there are important educational goals that 
don’t need to be mimetic (or imitative) in order for a teacher to adapt her 
instruction as a means to allowing students to meet these goals. For example, a 
teacher can set the (relatively underspecified) goal of helping students understand 
the importance of appreciating the pulls of patriotism (or regionalism, or 
sectarianism) in many national and international conflicts without having to clearly 
define what these terms mean or dividing how a student reaches this understanding 
into precise steps. Developing an understanding of complex ideas and concepts 
doesn’t necessarily come in steps; a single transformative moment or educational 
experience (facilitated by a teacher’s understanding of her student based on her use 
of formal and informal assessments) can develop it. Assessment and adaptive 
instruction—in this type of example—looks less like the work of Jackson’s piano 
teacher, or steps in a computer program (something Jackson often compares 
adaptive instruction to), and more like the work of an educator Jackson might 
describe as transformative.21 For example, as a teacher I might share the written 
personal testimony of a participant in a conflict, or a documentary that makes a 
conflict real for a student in ways that other means of instruction cannot, in order to 
help a student progress toward my instructional goal. I don’t need to break the 
development of understanding into steps that every single student marches 
through. But, just because I do not break my instruction into steps, it doesn’t mean 
that I—as a teacher—am not consistently assessing students and using the results of 
my assessment to adapt learning opportunities in ways that will allow each student 
to more successfully meet my goals. I have an end in mind—sophisticated 
understanding—and I use feedback and assessment to help students achieve that 
end in whatever manner works best for that particular student.22 
 Not only does adaptive instruction not need to progress sequentially, its 
goals needn’t be as limited (and limiting) as Jackson sees them. Jackson seems to 
believe that the only goals fit for adaptive instruction are mimetic ones. That is, the 
teacher needs to have a precise and uniform goal in mind for students in order to 
successfully adapt her instruction. A baseball player hitting a home run, a piano 
player playing a piece in conformity with expectations, a student successfully using 
algorithms to solve problems with a clear answer; these are the examples Jackson 
has in mind and these are the types of examples that circumscribe his 
understanding. He writes, “Instead of worrying about how teachers will know when 
their students have mastered this or that objective—an orientation that causes our 
thoughts to flow naturally in the direction of behaviorism and associated 
ideologies—we need ask whether there may not be some desirable outcomes of 
schooling that are not particularly well served by being translated into precise 
terms.”23 Behaviorism. According to Jackson, this is the mentality that a teacher is 
bound to when she sets a goal and uses assessment to empower students to reach it. 
While there may be some who see adaptive instruction this way, the 
characterization is—ultimately—misleading, or at least unhelpfully limited. And, I 
feel that Jackson’s attempt to offer counterexamples does little to help his case. That 
is, Jackson argues that adaptive instruction ultimately fails because there are just 
too many educational goals that do not fit an adaptive paradigm. As I hope to show, 
this is not the case. 
 First, Jackson argues that there are many instructional moments when a 
teacher doesn’t focus on student learning. He gives the example of lectures, and 
argues that the lecturer isn’t primarily concerned “if the material is getting across.” 
Jackson goes on to ask: “Shall we accuse him of being a poor teacher for his lack of 
interest in such matters?”24 What follows is likely a contentious claim, but I am of 
the mind that a lecturer should not be characterized as a teacher unless she is 
concerned with whether or not her students learn what she intends to teach. That is, 
if a teacher lectures a group of students, gives an assessment, and finds that very 
few students understood what she was lecturing on, then she needs to adapt her 
instruction so that students gain the intended understanding. While a lecture that 
inspires, or evokes, or entertains has all kinds of value, in order to qualify as 
instruction (and the lecturer a teacher) there needs to be a goal and the speaker 
must care if her audience realizes her goal. Jackson—I feel—anticipates this type of 
objection, and so makes his second point. Jackson argues that there are many cases 
of education we value where a teacher is “effecting in his students a change whose 
precise form cannot be determined in advance and whose “rightness” or 
“wrongness” cannot be judged even when the change is made manifest.”25 I am not 
sure I can agree with this.  
 It is surely the case that many things we value in education do not have a 
precise form that can be determined in advance. When we ask a child to write a 
poem, or to use an equation to pose—and not solve simple—problems, or to offer 
interpretations of historical events, teachers cannot know with any type of certainty 
what the student will do, and teachers often do not have a precise vision in mind of 
what a “correct” performance will look like. But, this doesn’t mean that the 
“rightness” or “wrongness” of what is made manifest cannot be judged and—
importantly—improved through the teacher’s use of assessment. Do we really 
believe that we cannot judge the quality of a student poem, or a student’s use of 
mathematics, or a student’s ability to offer a sophisticated interpretation of 
historical events? If we don’t, then why do we offer students grades on these types 
of things? Though it may be hard to offer the types of feedback that allow students 
who don’t initially perform well to perform better, I think it is unhelpful—and 
ultimately unprofessional practice as a teacher—to express or communicate to a 
student that no amount of feedback we give as a teacher will allow the student to 
meet the imprecise standard we are nonetheless grading her on. Teachers shouldn’t 
both pretend that their educational goals are ineffable while praising—through 
grades, feedback, recommendations, etc.—students who meet these goals and 
punishing students who do not. To put the point more positively, think about those 
teachers who facilitate opportunities for students to see success, either through 
rubrics or exemplars,26 and who are able to give the types of feedback and create the 
type of learning environment where the balance between freedom and discipline 
lead to a high percentage of successful performances for a great diversity of 
learners. These teachers find ways to step students through a process that leads to 
success, even in acts that are impossible to specify what success precisely looks like 
in advance of the moment when the teacher begins facilitating student learning.  
 Even if these criticisms are compelling, it is important to consider the full 
weight of Jackson’s conclusion. He argues that if we make monitoring student 
progress toward a goal “central to what teaching is all about, [then] a would-be 
profession remains no more than a trade. More serious than that, if our notions of 
teaching should ever be confined to what has herein been described as mimetic 
principles, the ultimate loser will not be the teachers, but those taught.”27 This is 
important. Should we conflate education with feedback and assessment? Even as we 
think about this question, I also can’t help but feel that Jackson’s picture of adaptive 
instruction is overly influenced by his making computer instruction adaptive 
instruction’s closest analog. That is, if we imagine teachers reading scripts that are 
meant to progress students sequentially toward a clearly defined goal, then teaching 
is not a profession, and students will likely suffer. And, given this vision of teaching 
and learning it seems like we might easily replace teachers with computers. But, as 
compelling as this line of thinking might be,28 it is not a fair or accurate description 
of adaptive education. Adaptive teaching is about a teacher knowing student and 
subject well enough to create connections that allow the highest number of students 
to achieve ambitious learning goals.29 More, I would argue that students suffer more 
in an un-adaptive environment and teaching remains de-professionalized when 
everyone involved in teaching isn’t thinking enough about how we can use 
assessment to improve learning outcomes for every student. Though talk of learning 
outcomes and student improvement may appear overly mimetic, this needn’t be the 
case.  
Adaptive education is—when we can look at it through a lens not overly 
influenced by things like computing metaphors—what every student deserves, and 
it is philosophically defeasible. It is certainly not bound to the mimetic tradition, and 
it is not destined to be non-transformative. In his response to Jackson, Robert Glaser 
makes key points worth considering. First, Glaser writes, “Feedback of information 
is a primary mechanism of human growth, development and evolution. In fact, it is 
the non-cybernetic models of learning we have most to fear, because they are 
insensitive to making teaching adaptive to the style and intellect of students.”30 I 
have to agree with Glaser. We have more to fear when teachers tout the ineffability 
of what they are teaching and do little to help a student progress toward that 
understanding. Importantly, this needn’t look like a computer program adapting to 
student performance; leading the student along a sequence to a predetermined 
conclusion. It will often look—to take Jackson’s exemplar of transformative 
teaching—Socratic in nature. Here I am thinking of a concerned teacher adapting his 
or her instruction to the needs of students in the pursuit of meaningful ends. Glaser 
notes, “models of excellence exist, but variations on it are counted as intellectual 
inventions and artistic improvisations that encourage the development of human 
intellectual endeavor, problem solving, and thinking. Certainly, mimetic principles 
are supplanted by exploratory ones in this conception.”31 To return to examples I 
offer above, we do know excellence in poetry, even though we don’t have formulas 
for creating poems; we know what the creative utilization of math looks like, even 
though we can’t directly transmit this knowledge (mimetically) to students; and, we 
know creative and insightful historical interpretation, even though no algorithms 
exist for its creation. But, we can help students develop this understanding, and can 
develop student understanding by offering exemplars and providing feedback as 
students work toward exemplary performance. As Glaser notes, there are “many 
situations [where] teachers do not have algorithms. But certainly, good teachers 
have heuristics.”32 
 As I hope to have demonstrated, there is so much that Jackson gets right, but 
he does get adaptive education wrong. Though there are ways in which adaptive 
education can be formulaic and bound to mimetic principles, when we push at the 
meaning of adaptive education, it is clear that what might be described as mimetic is 
indeed transformative. These examples, I believe, help us overcome the 
mimetic/transformative divide. When we set ambitious—even if hard to define—
goals and use consistent informative feedback tied to those goals to assist students 
in the realization of these goals, the line between transformative and mimetic 
becomes blurred. This blurring is important because instead of judging—through 
grades and other means—students against a standard we do not teach but which is 
nonetheless controlling, we use assessment and feedback to empower students to 
make progress toward the standard. Every student deserves the opportunity to 
experience the transformative dimensions of learning; holding that there is really no 
way to teach toward the standards that we most value seems problematic at best. In 
the final section I expand this line of thought with reference to examples that 
demonstrate how assessment and adaptive education harbor transformative 
possibilities for teaching, teachers and learners. 
 
Assessment, Adaptive Instruction and Teaching Worthy of the Name33 
 
One aspect of “The Mimetic and the Transformative” that I find particularly 
provocative and important is Jackson’s belief that students from current and 
historically underserved student populations receive overly mimetic (in the most 
pejorative sense of the word) forms of education.34 It is important to be critical of 
this.35 Terms like drill and control come to mind when we think about educating 
other people’s children. This way of putting the issue—I hope—calls to mind Lisa 
Delpit’s powerful thinking.36 While Delpit is critical of mimetic education in its 
pejorative sense, she also reminds us that not making something explicit is a certain 
type of injustice. Here is where I think we can continue to push the 
mimetic/transformative divide by using the lens of assessment. Do things like 
rubrics and assignment guidelines level down learning,37 or do they democratize 
and transform it? I think we might agree that drill and control can be extremely 
negative, but we have to wonder what happens when we leave unwritten—but 
ultimately controlling—cultural narratives and norms untaught and 
unacknowledged. When we don’t teach students these, not only do we not empower 
students, we leave that which is untaught in the dominant position. This is what I 
take to be one of Delpit’s most important points, and one that philosophers of 
education should think through. It is difficult to see how we can empower students 
to overcome controlling narratives and norms by leaving those norms and 
narratives untaught. Though we may disagree with the norms and narratives and 
though we know it is unjust that they are controlling in the ways that they are, they 
should not be ignored. It is difficult to overcome a problem we don’t acknowledge. 
Instead of holding to a belief that pretending or wishing that norms and narratives 
don’t exist is enough to make them go away, we need to address them squarely. 
Succeeding in an unjust society should be seen as the difficult thing that it is. If we 
do not live in acknowledgement of the dominant norms and narratives, success is 
difficult if not impossible; but, if we succeed in an unjust society, then we are 
comprised. We should not pretend that this is not the case. Instead of pretending, 
we need to make our norms and narratives explicit. This is a step toward 
transformation, even if the move can feel mimetic. Though the master’s tools may 
never dismantle the master’s house—to draw on the title of the masterful essay by 
Audre Lorde—we need to know how the master’s world works in order to develop 
the tools necessary to dismantle it. We need to spell out the un-spelled out in order 
to empower students and engage in transformative critique. A type of teaching that 
can feel overly mimetic and non-transformative, when viewed through the lens of 
the work of someone like Lisa Delpit can seem quite different. One can help effect a 
transformation for students through teaching that may appear squarely within the 
mimetic tradition.  
Moving from cultural critique to teacher education, Hugh Socket—in his book 
Knowledge and Virtue in Teaching and Learning: The Primacy of Dispositions38—
shows that we can make goals and aims explicit, and use assessment to help future 
teachers reach those goals, in ways that are not pejoratively mimetic. Sockett does 
the difficult—but invaluable—work of making what philosophically informed 
teaching might look like more explicit to teachers and teacher educators by offering 
heuristics (rubrics, questions for pre-service teachers and teacher educators) that 
aim to facilitate growth toward meaningful—even if impossible to make 
algorithmic—goals. While it is important to criticize assessments pre-service 
teachers are subjected to—be it InTASC standards or EdTPA exams—and while it is 
important to recognize the political nature of these assessments, there is still 
conceptually work to be done. We can keep working on alternatives, while exploring 
whether or not the current standards are as pejoratively mimetic as they might 
initially appear. For example, InTASC standard nine is on ethical practice, and it is 
hard to see why more philosophers aren’t engaged with defining what ethical 
practice means and how we can help teach teachers—using exemplars and 
rubrics—to make their work more ethical.39 I don’t think it is enough to wish that 
teachers were more moral in their practices, or to praise the moral when we see it; if 
we are engaged in the work of teacher education, we should empower teachers to 
realize the aims that we value through assessment and adaptive education. This is 
why I find Sockett’s work so valuable. It is one thing to be critical of exams, but it is 
far more valuable to do everything in our power to build a framework that allows 
the values that we find lacking in education to flourish. Teachers will always be 
assessed; instead of seeing assessment as a necessary evil, I believe we have an 
opportunity to see assessment as a transformative possibility. Developing a future 
teacher’s moral life in schools will most certainly not entail providing scripts, or 
offering algorithms, but reading foundational texts in education—something 
Jackson suggests in “Facing Our Ignorance”—is also (for many teachers) not enough 
either. Foundational texts and reflection are necessary, but they aren’t sufficient. 
Future teachers need to learn how to enact aims in practice,40 and they need 
feedback that will allow them to more powerfully enact—and reflect on—their aims. 
Sockett does this well, but when it comes to aims and their enactment, more voices 
are needed. We know that aims can be contentious, and it is important for 
philosophers of education to try to spell out the aims they find most important for 
teachers to enact in the classroom. But, the work cannot stop there. Philosophers of 
education can also think through the types of assessment that might facilitate 
growth toward those aims. It is important to move beyond critique and to the 
development of a conversation on aims and how they are enacted. Again, this may 
feel like a mimetic project, but I think the way to large-scale transformations of 
teaching and classroom life is making aims explicit and finding assessments that 
allow teachers to adapt their instruction to help students realize those aims.  
One of the most promising recent developments along this front is Mary 
Kennedy’s recent article: “Parsing Teaching.”41 Kennedy makes the case that we can 
decompose teaching—a recent goal in teacher education literature42—into 
component parts that can be reproduced in the classroom, but how we combine 
these parts, how we think about these parts coming together to form philosophically 
defeasible, moral, teaching is something that is far more difficult to accomplish. As I 
read Kennedy’s article, I can’t help but think she is calling for something like what 
Jackson hoped to accomplish in “The Mimetic and the Transformative”: a way of 
teaching where students learn the moves central to teaching (somewhat 
mimetically), while having the ability to rethink how these moves fit together and 
are reconstructed to serve new students, different contexts and evolving aims. 
Future teachers need to learn the moves—how to “enlist student participation,” how 
to “contain behavior,” and so on—but these moves cannot be applied mechanically 
and often come in conflict. As such, teachers also need to be taught—through 
observations and readings on exemplary performances by teachers, through 
facilitated reflection, etc.—what it would mean to enact a moral classroom in the 
light of all of the complexities of teaching. Philosophers of education can be valuable 
co-workers—with teacher educators and teachers—in projects like this. 
Finally, I want to bring our attention to two approaches to teaching 
prominent in K-12 schools, and approaches that I teach my future teachers: 
differentiated instruction43 and Understand by Design (UbD).44 Both of these 
approaches to teaching put assessment first, both are adaptive forms of instructions, 
but both also put transformative teaching first. In fact, both approaches make the 
strong point that learning cannot happen most effectively for every student unless 
the teacher has a clear learning target and uses assessment to help each student 
reach that target. Differentiated instruction and UbD are premised on the belief that 
it is unfair to judge students against an ineffable standard, and a belief that 
ambitious goals can guide adaptive instruction. That is, we can create rubrics and 
provide instances of exemplary performance—excellence in poetry, excellence in 
interpretation, excellence in creativity in math and science—so as to help students 
toward what was hitherto taken to be near impossible to teach. More, making the 
ineffable explicit does not cheapen or lesson what is learned; it doesn’t limit 
creativity: it empowers students. Adapting instruction doesn’t mean taking steps to 
a predetermined end, but it does mean having ambitious goals in mind and knowing 
how to use assessment to help students reach these goals. As a philosopher of 
education, I find these approaches to teaching extremely effective and interesting, 
but—to my knowledge—there are not many philosophically informed discussions of 
these prominent approaches to teaching in the philosophy of education literature.45 
I think this is a shame, because a close look at differentiated instruction and UbD 
show how adaptive education—guided by assessment—can fit squarely within the 
transformative tradition of teaching. Teachers who practice differentiated 
instruction don’t see teaching as leading students lockstep to a predetermined end; 
they use assessment to free students to realize an ambitious instructional goal 
through a variety of processes, through creating a variety of products and utilizing a 
variety of content. Jackson engages closely with mimetic teaching brilliantly in Life 
in Classrooms, and I think it is important to engage with prominent practices like 
differentiation and UbD today to see if—even in our mimetic educational era—new 
forms of transformative teaching are occurring precisely though the use of 
assessment and adaptive instruction. 
While Jackson was clearly skeptical of adaptive instruction and assessment, I 
think we need to rethink this skepticism and see the ways in which adaptive 
instruction and assessment can be transformative. It may be the case that making 
things explicit—having clear learning goals, discussing the norms that are 
controlling inside and outside the classroom—may have a leveling effect—limiting 
creativity and philosophical insight—but I think we need to test this hypothesis. I 
am of the mind that making things explicit through assessment targets will lead to 
transformative outcomes for many students who are currently underserved by 
current classroom practices.46 Combining the skepticism of the Jackson who wrote 
“The Mimetic and the Transformative: Alternative Outlooks on Teaching” with the 
keen eye for classroom practices embodied by his Life in Classrooms will—I feel—
help us see ways in which what we may take to be mimetic practices harbor the 
transformative, and—in doing this—lead to new futures for philosophers of 
education. In the end, I think this approach will allow us to be far more critical of 
pejoratively mimetic education, while allowing transformative education new 
possibilities. Adaptive education—guided by assessment—can lead to student 
growth and empowerment; it also offers philosophers of education opportunities to 
reengage with larger conversations in education. These conversations need the 
voice of philosophers of education. As a field, we need to think through how 
assessment and adaptive education—which are clearly going to remain central to 
classroom practice, and which have been demonstrated to be effective by 
educational researchers47—can be transformative, and philosophers of education 
may be uniquely suited to doing the conceptual work of showing how a new 




Conceptual work alone will not—to be sure—lead to political changes that will 
upend our mimetic educational era. Nonetheless, without a vision, possibilities 
perish. Jackson knew, as we do now, that individual teachers are finding ways to 
combine what is good in the mimetic and transformative teaching traditions, but 
given the overall climate of teaching these individual voices are not enough to 
change conversations. Dewey laments this fact in The Sources of a Science of 
Education. He writes: 
 
the successes of such individuals [exceptional teachers] tend to be born and 
to die with them: beneficial consequences extend to those pupils who have 
personal contact with such gifted teachers. No one can measure that waste 
and loss that have come from the fact that the contributions of such men and 
women in the past have been thus confined, and the only way by which we 
can prevent such waste in the future is by methods which enable us to make 
an analysis of what the gifted teacher does intuitively, so that something 
accruing from his work can be communicated to others.48 
 
As I read this quote, I see Dewey calling for closer partnerships between 
philosophers of education, teacher educators and teachers. If our hope is to forge a 
new tradition of teaching where assessment and adaptive instruction are used to 
promote transformative ends, there is a lot to learn from teachers who are finding 
ways to enact transformative teaching in a mimetic era. Concept-building is 
important. Doris Santoro found a language—demoralization—that fits what 
teaching looks like in our era, and I think we might do something similar when it 
comes to the mimetic and the transformative. Assessment can be terribly mis-
educative and constraining. The term “eduprenuerial” adaptive education49 sounds 
nightmarish. But, this doesn’t mean that assessment and adaptive education cannot 
be transformative. In fact, and as I hope to have shown above, the transformative is 
given new possibilities because of assessment and adaptive education. What is 
needed is a new language of teaching that moves beyond the mimetic and the 
transformative, and to a language that does justice to all of those individual teachers 
doing good work with assessment and adaptive instruction, and all of those 
individual philosophers of education conceptualizing futures for education, and all 
of those parents, citizens and students who can feel and see the potential in our 
educational present that lies dormant. Individuals are not enough; what is needed is 
work on a vision beyond the mimetic and transformative that will usher in an era 
where assessment and adaptive instruction are used to promote the potential of 
each learner. Again, politics are important, and our current era is pejoratively 
mimetic. But, this shouldn’t keep us bound in and to a dualism; we need to see 
assessment and adaptive instruction for what they can be: freeing, educative; 
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